This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda-setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agendasetters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low and high turnout elections.
I. Introduction
Beginning with Rosenthal's (1978, 1979) seminal work, scholars have recognized the importance of agenda-setting in direct democracy. In Romer and Rosenthal's model the agenda-setter derives its power from the ability to select the policy alternatives from which voters choose. However there are a number of cases in the United States in which agenda-setters in direct democracy settings have an additional source of agenda-control: the ability to select the date on which voters choose. In this paper I focus on the ability of agenda-setters in a local public finance and statewide initiative setting to strategically use this election timing power.
The idea that political actors may strategically time elections is not new. In many parliamentary democracies the governing party can call for early elections, which has led to a substantial literature in comparative politics on election timing.
1 This literature primarily focuses on political actors scheduling elections to take advantage of favorable economic conditions or party valiance. In contrast, the primary source of agenda power in direct democracy is the ability to schedule a referendum concurrently with other races.
Because individuals mobilized to vote by other races often cast votes on a referendum, the median voter's preferred policy on a referendum's issue dimension may vary with the remaining composition of the ballot. I hypothesize that agenda-setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produces a policy closest to their preferred outcome.
To test my theory of the strategic timing of direct democracy I use data on the timing of school referenda in Wisconsin. Wisconsin school boards have the power to select the election date for school referenda. I test whether school board's use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the support for pro-educational spending political candidates in low and high turnout elections. As predicted by the theory, the use of special elections is related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low and high turnout elections. Holding fixed the vote shares of proeducational spending candidates in high turnout elections, school boards are significantly more likely to hold school referenda in special elections as the vote shares of proeducational spending candidates in low turnout elections increases.
Having found evidence that school boards strategically time elections, I next explore whether this strategic timing affects election outcomes. I do so by comparing the passage rates of school referenda by election date in Wisconsin and the neighboring state of Minnesota, where school boards have less agenda-power over the timing of elections.
Substantially different patterns are observed in the two states; in Wisconsin the highest passage rate occur in high turnout elections, while in Minnesota the highest passage occurs in low turnout elections. This pattern is suggestive that the strategic timing of elections affects outcomes.
Finally, I discuss the possibility of the strategic timing of statewide initiatives. I specifically focus on the potential for agenda-setters to strategically time initiatives for primary elections. I highlight Proposition 55, an initiative to increase funding for school construction from the 2004 California presidential primary, as an example of an initiative that may have benefited from being held during a primary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses relevant literature. Section III outlines the school referendum process in Wisconsin, discusses the identification strategy to test for strategic timing, and describes the Wisconsin referenda data. Section IV presents results of the tests of strategic timing. Section V discusses the possibility of the strategic timing of statewide initiatives. Section VI concludes.
II. Relevant Literature
Romer and Rosenthal's (1978 and Rosenthal's ( , 1979 setter model provides the foundations for this paper. In the setter model a monopolistic budget maximizing agenda-setter leverages the disutility voters receive from the reversion policy if a referendum fails to extract greater expenditure than is preferred by the median voter. The only agenda control available to the setter is the amount of the referendum to be considered against the status quo. In this paper I consider situations where the agenda-setter determines both the alternative and the timing of the election. In such a situation the agenda-setter can also leverage the power to schedule elections to take advantage of any differences in the preferences of voters across different types of elections.
Agenda power over the timing of referenda may be particularly central in a local politics setting because of the importance of election concurrency in affecting voter turnout. The largest determinant of local election participation is the concurrency of a local election with an election for state or federal office (Hajnal and Lewis 2003, Wood 2002) . Moreover, differences in turnout propensity in concurrent and stand-alone local elections are thought to be related to outcome preferences. Piele and Hall's (1973) summary of the literature concludes that parents, property owners, and middle-aged voters are relatively more represented in stand-alone school elections than in concurrent elections. More recently Moe (2005) shows that school employees who stand to directly benefit from the passage of school referenda vote at disproportionately high rates in special school elections. Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks (1997) previously discuss the strategic use of special elections for school referenda. Using a Riker-Ordeshook (1968) turnout framework where individuals vote when their expected benefit from affecting the outcome of the election exceeds the cost of voting, they contend that individuals with extreme preferences are relatively more likely to turnout in stand-alone versus concurrent elections. Arguing that school referenda have concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks conclude that using special elections increases the probability of passage. Therefore, they contend that use of special elections for referenda is indicative of strategic election timing. Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks offer three pieces of empirical evidence to support their hypothesis: losing referenda are often proposed again at an equal or greater amount within a relatively short time frame 2 , school bonds are statistically less likely than municipal bonds to be proposed during the time when schools are on summer vacation and school boards elected in non-concurrent elections are more likely to propose school bonds in non-concurrent elections.
This paper advances on Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks' (1997) analysis. I show that the use of special elections for school referenda is related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low and high turnout elections. This provides a more direct and discriminating empirical test of the strategic timing of elections than Dunne, Reed, and 2 See also Romer, Rosenthal, and Ladha (1984) that finds agenda-setters do not completely update on information contained in past election results and Rosenthal (1990) This type of strategic timing of initiatives is done to affect other races concurrently on the ballot. In contrast, I focus on the strategic timing of referenda and initiatives to help the 3 For example, a positive correlation between the use of special elections to elect school board members and special elections to vote on school bonds is likely to exist independent of any strategic behavior due to unobserved community preferences over the number of elections. 4 This finding is consistent with the mixed empirical evidence on the effects of turnout on support for school referenda. Pecquet, Coats, and Yen (1996) find the proportion supporting Louisiana school bonds is lower in concurrent elections. Rubinfeld (1977) finds that changes in turnout, and not vote choice, explain a shift in the electoral success of a single referendum. Moreover, he finds that these changes in voter turnout are unrelated to changes in the relative price of the referendum caused by a law change. Inman (1978) finds little evidence that voter turnout affects election outcomes in a sample of Long Island, New
York school districts. Rubinfeld and Thomas (1980) find no evidence that turnout decisions relate to voter demand for education expenditure in the only micro-level analysis of voter turnout in school referenda.
passage of the referenda and initiatives. The strategic timing of initiatives and referenda for the purpose of passing the referenda and initiative relies on turnout spillovers from other races on the ballot onto initiatives and referenda. Thus while spillovers generate the incentives for strategic timing in both cases, the form of the spillover is quite different.
III. Wisconsin School District Referenda
In the early 1990s the state of Wisconsin enacted two laws that reduced school boards' power to increase school spending. The first limited the amount of long-term debt a school district can carry to 10% of its equalized property value. The second created a revenue limit that capped the amount that a school district can increase its current school expenditure. In both cases the laws allowed for these limits to be exceeded through voter approved referendum. If a referendum passes, school expenditure can increase by the amount specified; a failed referendum implies that school expenditure remains at its current level. 5 Local school boards determine both the timing and amount of the referendum. If the referendum is held in conjunction with a regularly scheduled election, the school district pays for the ballots and the municipality pays for the poll workers. If the referendum is scheduled as a special election, the school district is responsible for all costs.
6
The laws in Wisconsin provide a quasi-experiment to test the theory of the strategic timing of direct democracy. School boards are an agenda-setter that arguably can be characterized as budget maximizers. This characterization may be particularly accurate in this case because referenda only occur when school boards want to increase school spending. Because school boards are responsible for more of the election costs in a special election, all other factors equal, the school board would prefer to hold the referendum as part of a regularly scheduled election. Therefore additional factors must exist to cause school boards to propose referenda in special elections. I predict that an important factor in determining a school board's use of special elections will be differences in the educational spending preferences of likely voters in low and high turnout elections.
To test whether school boards are strategically timing school referenda for Table 1 . 13 The one exception is 1996, when the elections were moved up two weeks to accommodate the Wisconsin presidential primary.
IV. Analysis
I model the decision to hold a special election using a probit regression specification where school boards in district i propose a referendum in a special election As discussed in the previous section, fewer statewide elections occur in odd years.
Consequently a larger percentage of referenda are held in special elections in odd years (57.7%) than even years (28.8%). By not controlling for this effect, the estimated coefficients may suffer from omitted variable bias. Because the scheduling of an election for this period is strategic choice, however, including an odd year dummy variable could potentially bias the coefficients. As a result I estimate regression specifications twice: once with and once without an odd year dummy variable. Obtaining similar coefficient estimates in both specifications helps alleviate bias concerns.
Regression results are presented in Table 2 . The regression reported in column (1) uses the full sample of referenda from 1990 -2006 and includes the percent Burmaster, the percent Doyle the percent of electorate with children in public schools, the percent of the electorate over 65, and indicators for the type of referenda as covariates.
Using this specification I estimate that λ = 0.017 (p = 0.031). This estimate of λ implies that holding all other covariates at their sample average, a one standard deviation increase in vote differential increases the probability of holding a special election by 4.8 percentage points. I obtain almost an identical estimate of λ in the regression reported in column (2) that adds an odd year dummy variable. In the regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) I also include a number of additional control variables. Using the full specification in column (4), I estimate that λ = 0.017 (p = 0.034), which corresponds to a 4.7 percentage point increase in the probability of holding a special election from a one standard deviation increase in vote differential when holding other variables at their sample means.
I present a number of robustness checks on my baseline specification in columns (5) - (8) of Table 2 . One weakness of the baseline regressions reported in columns (1) -(4) of Table 2 Two additional patterns emerge from the results reported in Table 2 . The first is that more expensive referenda are more likely to be held in special elections. There are multiple potential mechanisms for this result. First, the fixed cost of holding a special election may make them prohibitively costly for small referenda. Instead, school boards may be endogenously raising the referenda amount in special elections. Finally, it may be that expensive referenda perform relatively worse in high turnout elections. The second pattern of note is that non-reoccurring cost referenda are less likely to be held in special elections. As previously mentioned, non-reoccurring referenda tend to be for expenditures on maintenance or technological improvements. Previous research has suggested that in the cross-section such expenditures are more popular with the electorate at-large (Beckman and Maiden, 2003 Table 4 shows that general election voters in the two states are very similar demographically. This finding further suggests that Wisconsin school boards are aware of the characteristics of their school district's electorate and schedule referenda accordingly. Moreover, it suggests that while Dunne, Reed, Wilbanks are correct that on average school referenda will perform better in lower turnout elections, this is not universally true across school districts.
To better understand the mechanisms leading to the patterns observed in Table 3 Table 5 indicates there is heterogeneity across school 15 Unfortunately, a number of variables of interest that are found in some other states' voter files, such as race, gender, or political affiliation, are not contained in the Minnesota file.
districts in the relative increase in elderly voters in low turnout elections, consistent with the finding that there are differential incentives to use low turnout elections.
V. Statewide Initiatives
Empirical evidence in the previous section suggests that agenda-setters in a local public finance setting strategically time referenda. In this section I consider whether agenda-setters may also be able to do the same in the statewide initiative context. There is heterogeneity in the agenda rules specifying the types of elections in which statewide initiatives reach voters. A majority of initiative states restrict initiatives to general election ballots. In Alaska, California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma statewide initiatives are allowed on primary or special election ballots, while in Colorado, Maine, Mississippi, Ohio, and Washington initiatives are allowed in odd year statewide elections (Waters, 2003) . Those voters who abstain in primary, special, and odd-year elections are generally not randomly selected from the population of general election voters. As a result, there may be situations where agenda-setters strategically schedule their initiatives for these elections.
16
Primary elections may be particularly ripe for the strategic timing of initiatives because it is often well known in advance that one party will be mobilized disproportionately. Because first-term presidents often run unopposed for their parties' nomination in the next election cycle, agenda-setters often can anticipate which parties electorate will be mobilized to participate more in presidential primary elections. only Democratic voters were mobilized by a contested presidential primary. Table 6 demonstrates that 
VI. Conclusion
Direct democracy is often justified normatively on the grounds that it represents the will of the median voter. This justification is less compelling if agenda-setters are selecting the median voter. This paper demonstrates that agenda-setters can use election timing power to select voters that will be more favorable towards their policy interests.
As a result, both researchers and policy makers need to seriously consider how the rules surrounding agenda establishment in direct democracy affect economic and political outcomes.
The policy question of whether initiatives and referenda should be allowed in offcycle elections is closely related to a similar question of whether local elections should be scheduled concurrently with state and federal elections. Hajnal and Lewis (2003) document the substantial increase in turnout in local elections when local elections are paired with state and federal elections. At the same time they also note that historically there have been a number of objections to pairing local elections with higher turnout state and federal elections. One objection is that information needed to make informed choices may be crowded out by coverage of higher profile races. Another objection is that voters with limited knowledge of issues at hand may feel obligated to cast ballots. 17 These objections are particularly relevant to initiatives and referenda because uninformed voters tend to systematically choose the status quo policy (Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002 
